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Philosophical considerations always already entangled in mathematics 
education research 
 
David W. Stinson 
 
 Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA 
 
 
Abstract: In this paper, I explore how mathematics education research is always already 
entangled with and in ontological, epistemological, and ethical considerations—that is, 
philosophical considerations—of the researcher (or research team) from beginning to end. The 
danger in too much of the existing mathematics education research, however, is limited 
acknowledgement of how philosophical considerations drive both knowledge production and 
knowledge dissemination in the field. Illustrating how the concepts ontology, epistemology, and 
ethics are made sense of across the research paradigm spectrum—predict, understand, 
emancipate, and deconstruct—sheds light on not only the possible divergences in approaches to 
research (mathematics education or otherwise) but also the interrelatedness of the concepts. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the past 30 years or so, several mathematics education researchers and scholars have 
explored just what the inclusion of a philosophical dimension might provide the discipline 
mathematics education (cf. Higginson, 1980). In the early 1980s, this inclusion was demonstrated 
through the formation of the Topic Study Group on Theory in Mathematics Education in 1984 at 
the 5th International Congress for Mathematical Education. Within the discussions of that group, 
philosophical considerations often took center stage. The purpose of the group, as Steiner (1985) 
summarized, was “to give mathematics education a higher degree of self-reflectedness and self-
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assertiveness, to promote another way of thinking and of looking at the problems and their 
interrelations” (p. 16, emphasis in original). International collaborations found in edited volumes 
from the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s have continue to illustrate the importance of including 
philosophical dimensions. For instance, edited volumes such as the International Commission on 
Mathematical Instruction study Mathematics Education as a Research Domain: A Search for 
Identity (Sierpinska & Kilpatrick, 1998) and the three editions of the International Handbook of 
Mathematics Education (Bishop et al., 1996, 2003; Clements et al., 2013) contain several chapters 
exploring philosophical dimensions. Paul Ernest, through his many books and edited volumes 
(e.g., Ernest, 1991,  1994a, 1994b, 1998) and his founding and ongoing editorship of the 
Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal, approaching its 30-year anniversary, is the most 
noted scholar who continues to bring philosophical dimensions to the fore in mathematics 
education. 
Ernest (1991), in his foundational and often-cited book The Philosophy of Mathematics Education, 
surveys the philosophical dimensions of both mathematics and mathematics education. Drawing 
on Higginson’s (1980) argument that all human intellectual activity rests on assumptions of a 
philosophical type, Ernest questions some of the ontological, epistemological, and ethical 
problems and issues (among others) surrounding the philosophy of mathematics, the nature of 
learning, the aims of education, the nature of teaching, and the philosophy of mathematics 
education. Recently, Ernest (2016b) contended that applying philosophical methods to 
 
mathematics education matters because it gives people new ‘glasses’ through which to see the world. It 
enables people to see beyond official stories about the society, mathematics, and education. It provides 
thinking tools for questioning the status quo, for seeing ‘what’ is not what ‘has to be’; enabling us to 
imagine alternatives [sic] possibilities. (p. 2) 
 
Here, I aim to assist others in imagining alternative possibilities by exploring the sense making of 
ontology, epistemology, and ethics within the historical moments of mathematics education 
research (Stinson & Bullock, 2012). I begin by connecting these philosophical considerations to 
paradigms of inquiry (i.e., theoretical and methodological considerations)—more familiar terrain 
for mathematics education researchers. 
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PARADIGMS OF INQUIRY AND MATHEMATICS EDUCATION RESEARCH 
Details of various paradigms of inquiry available to mathematics education researchers through 
the overlapping and simultaneously operating historical moments of mathematics education 
research—the process–product moment (1970s–), the interpretivist–constructivist moment 
(1980s–), the social-turn moment (mid-1980s–), and the sociopolitical-turn moment (2000s–)—
are provided elsewhere (see Stinson & Bullock [2012, 2015] for details of each moment and 
identified exemplars of mathematics education research studies within each moment). Without 
recounting the details, Table 1 (Stinson & Walshaw, 2017, p. 133) maps these ongoing historical 
moments (i.e., no end dates) to different paradigms of inquiry—predict, understand, emancipate, 
and deconstruct—which, in turn, support different theoretical frameworks and methodological 
approaches (see Stinson & Bullock, 2015, for details and cautioning of Table 1). Paradigms of 
inquiry highlight for researchers “what it is they are about, and what falls within and outside the 
limits of legitimate inquiry”; they are defined by responses to three fundamental and interrelated 
questions: the ontological question, the epistemological question, and the methodological question 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). The three questions are interrelated “because the answer given to 
any one question, taken in any order, constrains [more times than not] how the others may be 
answered” (p. 108).  
Therefore, within each of the moments, within each of the paradigms, and within each of the 
theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches questions of ontology, epistemology, and, 
I add, ethics (among others) are always already entangled and are either knowingly or unknowingly 
engaged. Given that theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches are embedded in 
paradigms of inquiry, and paradigms of inquiry are embedded in assumptions of a philosophical 
type (cf. Crotty, 1998), no researcher (or research team) working in any moment, any paradigm, 
or any framework or approach, I believe, should be absolved from engaging questions of a 
philosophical type (cf. Ernest, 1991; Higginson, 1980).  
Mirroring others (e.g., Crotty, 1998; Lather, 2006; Guba & Lincoln, 1994), I use the different 
paradigms of inquiry—predict, understand, emancipate, and deconstruct (see Table 1)—to 
structure the discussion. In that, how the concepts ontology, epistemology, and ethics are made 
sense of across the paradigm spectrum sheds light on not only the possible divergences in 
approaches to research (mathematics education or otherwise) but also the interrelatedness of the 
concepts. 
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Table 1: Mapping Moments of Mathematics Education Research to Paradigms of Inquiry 
 
 Process–Product Moment (1970s–)Predict 
 Interpretivist–Constructivist Moment (1980s–)Understand 
 Social-Turn Moment (mid 1980s–)Understand (albeit, contextualized understanding) or Emancipate 
(or oscillate between the two) 
 Sociopolitical-Turn Moment (2000s–)Emancipate or Deconstruct (or oscillate between the two) 
 
Paradigms of Inquiry 
Predict Understand Emancipate  Deconstruct 
 
*Positivist 
Experimental 
Quasi-
experimenta
l 
Mixed 
methods> 
 
 
*Interpretivist 
Social constructivist 
Radical constructivist 
Sociocultural> 
Phenomenological 
Ethnographic 
Symbolic Interaction 
 
 
*Critical 
<Feminist> 
Critical Race Theory> 
Latino/a Critical Race Theory> 
Critical Theories of Race> 
<Participatory Action Research 
Critical Ethnography 
 
 B
RE
AK
 
 
*Poststructural/ 
Postmodern 
Postcritical 
Postcolonial 
Posthumanist 
Post-Freudian 
<Discourse Analysis 
 
Note. *Indicates the term most commonly used; < or > indicates cross-paradigm movement. The BREAK in 
the original Lather and St. Pierre table indicated a shift from the Enlightenment humanist paradigms on 
the left to the post-Enlightenment, posthumanist paradigm on the right. Here it indicates a hybrid, in-
between space where the researcher might adopt a critical postmodern theoretical tradition (see Stinson 
& Bullock, 2012, 2015). 
 
Paradigms of inquiry adapted from table by P. A. Lather and B. St. Pierre, 2005, found in “Paradigm 
Proliferation as a Good Thing to Think With: Teaching Research in Education as a Wild Profusion,” by P. A. 
Lather, 2006, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 19(1), p. 37. 
 
 
Reprinted from “Exploring Different Theoretical Frontiers for Different (and Uncertain) Possibilities in 
Mathematics Education Research,” by D. W. Stinson and M. A. Walshaw, 2017. In J. Cai (Ed.), 
Compendium for Research in Mathematics Education, p. 133. Copyright 2017 by the National Council 
of Teachers of Mathematics. 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND MATHEMATICS EDUCATION 
RESEARCH 
But before I briefly discuss ontology, epistemology, and ethics, two caveats are necessary. First, 
although the concepts are presented as discrete, they are in fact continuous (i.e., interrelated); in 
that, to speak about one always includes speaking implicitly or explicitly about the other two (see 
Cannon, 2019, for a brief discussion of Karen Barad’s ethico-onto-epistem-ology in mathematics 
education research). Philosophical engagement in general is complex and multilayered; it requires 
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filigree ways of thinking with multiple and overlapping trajectories; ways of thinking that embrace 
uncertainty and openness rather than the fictions of certainty and closure. Second, the discussion 
is intended to be neither an argument between quantitative science versus qualitative science (see 
Ercikan & Roth, 2006) nor an argument between continental philosophy versus analytic 
philosophy (see Cooper, 1994). But rather, an informative discussion in which no matter where a 
person positions herself or himself (or themself) on the paradigm spectrum she or he (or they) sees 
the importance of knowingly engaging philosophical considerations throughout the research 
process. 
Ontology 
Ontology is one of those philosophical concepts that philosophers and theorists as well as 
researchers acknowledge but most attempt to quickly move over, under, or around in efforts to 
avoid meeting it head on. Its metaphysical part is its most avoided. Recall, in the context of social 
science research in general, the ontological question is the first of three interrelated questions to 
ask with respect to which paradigm(s) of inquiry the researcher might be positioned: “What is the 
form and nature of reality and therefore, what is there that can be known about it” (Guba & Lincoln, 
1994, p. 108). Ontology in the context of mathematics education (research or otherwise) is further 
complicated by the “realness” (or not) of two specific entities: mathematical objects and human 
beings (Ernest, 2016a). The prevailing ontology of mathematical objects for over two millenniums, 
Platonism, asserts that mathematical objects exist independent of human beings’ thought, 
language, and practices. Ernest (1998), however, in careful detail discusses and critiques this 
ontological stance and others in his argument for a social constructivism as a philosophy of 
mathematics and, in turn, of mathematics education (research or otherwise) (see also Davis & 
Hersh, 1981/1998; Hersh, 1997; Tymoczko, 1998). The move toward a social constructivism as a 
philosophy of mathematics teaching, learning, and research engages ontological considerations of 
the nature of human beings. Here, it is not only a question of the nature of mathematical objects 
but also a question of the nature of “the ‘non-essential essence’ of learners, teachers and persons 
in general presupposed by teaching, learning and research in mathematics” (Ernest, 2016a, p. 7).  
Ontological considerations are understood differently in each of the paradigms of inquiry: predict, 
understand, emancipate, and deconstruct. For instance, ontology in the predict paradigm (i.e., 
positivists) is objective realism, a view that objects—for example, mathematical objects—exist 
independent of the knower. Reality here is “objective” and “found” (Lather, 2006). This objective 
found reality is ordered by natural laws and mechanisms; the “‘way things are’ is conventionally 
summarized in the form of time- and context-free generalizations, some of which take the form of 
cause–effect laws” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 109). Direct experience not speculation is the 
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foundation of science, which advances “by a study of the ‘given’ (in Latin datum or, in the plural, 
data)” (Crotty, 1998, p. 20). 
Ontology for the interpretivists and constructivists of the understand paradigm is subjective 
relativism. The real here is “apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mental 
constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature…and dependent for 
their form and content on the individual persons or groups holding the constructions (Guba & 
Lincoln, p. 110–111). Although there are important differences between the relativism of 
interpretivists and the relativism of constructivists, an essential similarity is that both uncritically 
accept the realness of their individual and collective interpretations and constructions (Crotty, 
1998); critical here is understood in the critical theoretical sense (cf. Bronner, 2011). In short, 
reality is subjectively yet uncritically interpreted and constructed (Lather, 2006). 
Historical realism is the ontology of the emancipate paradigm (i.e., critical theorists). What is real 
is shaped by current and historical social, cultural, political, economic, racial, ethnic, gender, and 
so forth discourses (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Discourses here are to be understood not only as 
language but also as the complex web of institutions, structures, signs, and practices that order and 
sustain socio-historical, -cultural, and -political constructed forms of social existence (Leistyna, 
Woodrum, & Sherblom, 1996). These discourses are reified and sustained with and in hegemonic 
structures that “are now (inappropriately) taken as ‘real,’ that is, natural and immutable” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). Hegemony constructs people as objects—those who are acted upon, rather 
than Subjects, those who act—who become so entrenched in their own oppressive condition that 
they do not realize their own subjugation or their complicity in the perpetuation of unjust social 
and economic systems (Freire, 1970/2000). Reality in brief is constituted with and in hegemonic 
systems of socio-historical, -cultural, and -political discourses of power (Lather, 2006). 
Reality for the poststructuralists and postmodernists of the deconstruct paradigm is unknowable: 
that which exist is always already contingent, multiple, fragmented, and becoming. There is an 
incredulity toward universal metanarratives of being (cf. Lyotard, 1979/1984). The one universal 
mind of the rational human subject is replaced here with multiple minds, multiple subjects, and 
multiple knowledges that reflect different socio-historical, -cultural, and -political locations 
(Seidman, 1994). The ontology of the deconstruct paradigm therefore is an anti-universal realism 
that attempts “to pass beyond man [and woman] and humanism” (Derrida, 1978, 292). Such an 
ontology, however, is more than simply a critique of realism; in that, “it questions representation 
and the underlying belief of a reality that is independent of representation yet capturable by it” 
(Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 14). In other words, “the real is not only what can be reproduced, but 
that which is already reproduced” (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 146).  
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Epistemology 
Epistemology, unlike ontology, is often embraced by philosophers, theorists, and researchers as a 
productive site for research. The absence per se of a metaphysical component makes engaging 
epistemological considerations more consistent with the Enlightenment—the Age of Reason (cf. 
Foucault, 1978/2003). The growth of epistemological perspectives has been exponential; for every 
discipline of human pursuit there seems to be a proliferation of epistemologies.  
Recall, the epistemological question is the second of three interrelated questions to ask with respect 
to researcher position across the paradigm spectrum: “What is the nature of the relationship 
between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known?” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 
108). In the context of social science research in general, Crotty (1998) defines epistemology as 
“the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby in the methodology” 
(p. 3). Such a definition makes explicitly engaging epistemological considerations throughout the 
research process inescapable. Where a researcher might be able to engage ontology implicitly (or 
not at all), such a strategy is not possible here. In the context of mathematics education, researchers 
and educators often hold different and at times conflicting epistemological stances. These conflicts 
often “lie along issues such as the subjective–objective character of knowledge, the role in 
cognition of the social and cultural context, and the relationship between language and knowledge” 
(Sierpinska & Lerman, 1996, p. 829). These conflicts stretch across the paradigm spectrum, given 
that epistemology too is understood differently in each paradigm of inquiry. 
Objectivism, for instance, is the epistemology for the positivists of the predict paradigm. Here, the 
researcher and the researched “object” are independent entities, and the researcher is capable of 
researching the object without influencing it or being influenced by it (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Ideologies and biases of the researcher do not influence research findings as long as the 
prescriptive procedures of positivist science are rigorously followed (Guba & Lincoln). Objective 
knowledge is not only ideologically free but also universal; replicated findings are not only 
possible but also “true.” 
The interpretivist and constructivist of the understand paradigm maintain a subjectivist 
epistemology. The researcher and the researched object here are forever linked through 
interactions; therefore, the findings are essentially produced in and through the research process 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The world and objects do not exist independent of interpretations and 
constructions of the world and objects. In other words, consciousness—interpretivist and 
constructivist—“is always consciousness of something” (Crotty, 1998, p. 44, emphasis in original). 
Interpretivists understand knowledge as “culturally derived and historically situated interpretations 
of the social life-world” (p. 67). Constructivists, on the other hand, understand knowledge as 
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“contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interactions between human 
beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context” (p. 42). 
Different people and groups interpret and construct meanings differently; in that, both 
interpretations and constructions are socially and experientially based and local and specific in 
nature. 
Similarly, critical theorists of the emancipate paradigm also acknowledge that different people and 
groups interpret and construct meanings differently. These interpretations and constructions, 
however, are embedded in a critical subjectivist epistemology that is forever intertwined with and 
in hegemonic discourses of socio-historical, -cultural, and -political power (cf. Kincheloe & 
McLaren, 1994; Kincheloe, McLaren, & Steinberg, 2011). Knowledge therefore is neither 
ideologically free nor universal but rather made in and through discourses of domination and 
oppression (Freire, 1970/2000). 
The epistemological stance in the deconstruct paradigm is one in which the “nature” of knowledge 
found in humanism is replaced with the “discursive formation” of knowledge made in and through 
discursive events (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 38). Knowledge as discursive formation is not 
concerned with uncovering the “truth” of the statements and discourses that comprise discursive 
events per se but rather with the “historical conditions, assumptions, and power relations that allow 
certain statements, and by extension, certain discourses to appear” (St. Pierre, 2000, p. 496). The 
field of discursive events, however, is a grouping that is always finite and limited at any moment 
to the linguistic sequences that have been formulated; these sequences may be innumerable, they 
may exceed the capacities of recording, memory, or reading; nevertheless, they form a finite 
grouping (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 27). In effect, knowledge as discursive formation no longer 
maintains its privileged status as an objective reality, but rather knowledge itself becomes 
subjected to and limited by the very socio-historical, -cultural, and -political conditions, 
assumptions, and power relations against which natural knowledge within the humanist tradition 
claimed immunity (Stinson, 2016). 
Ethics 
Ethics is often regarded as the most accessible branch of philosophy given that “many of its 
presuppositions are self-evident or trivial truths: All human actions, for example, serve some end 
or purpose; whether they are right or wrong depends on an actor’s overall aims” (Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017, para. 4). Dewey and Tufts (1932/1985) describe ethics simply 
as “a systematic account of our judgments about conduct, in so far as these estimate it from the 
standpoint of right or wrong, good or bad” (p. 9). Similar to epistemology, there has been a 
proliferation of “codes of ethics” with nearly ever discipline of human pursuit developing its own. 
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A commonality of these multiple codes with respect to research is that they often provide 
guidelines on four overlapping areas of procedural concern: informed consent, deception, privacy 
and confidentiality, and accuracy (Christians, 2011; see also Sowder, 1998). 
In the context of social science research in general, Guillemin and Gillam (2004) identify two 
dimensions of ethical concern: “procedural ethics and ‘ethics in practice’” (p. 262). They define 
procedural ethics as those ethical concerns most often addressed by research ethics committees 
(e.g., Institutional Review Boards). They define ethics in practice as the ongoing day-to-day ethical 
concerns that arise throughout the research process (e.g., the disclosure of sensitive information 
from a research participant). Although Guillemin and Gillam perceive continuity between the two 
dimensions, they frame ethics in practice within reflexivity. Reflexivity requires thinking about 
the researcher’s positionality and how the process of conducting research affects the study and the 
human relationships developed throughout the study (Glesne, 1999). In being reflexive, the 
researcher becomes alert not only to concerns related to knowledge creation (i.e., epistemology) 
but also to the ethical concerns of research (Guillemin & Gillam). Here, the researcher adopts “a 
continuous process of critical scrutiny and interpretation, not just in relation to the research 
methods and the data but also to the researcher, participants, and the research context” (p. 275). 
Similarly, in the context of mathematics education research, Ernest (2012; see also Adler & 
Lerman, 2003) makes a four-point argument for ethics as the “first philosophy” of mathematics 
education research. First, ethics is at the center of the research process with respect to seeking 
informed consent, causing no harm or detriment, and ensuring confidentiality for all those involved 
(i.e., procedural ethics). Ernest claims that any research that does not conform to these most basic 
standards “is ethically flawed and its knowledge claims are suspect” (p. 13). Second, mathematics 
education researchers are participating “in the great, age-old human conversation that sustains and 
extends our common knowledge and cultural heritage,” as such “we and others benefit and grow” 
(p. 13.) Third, the species of human beings depends on its survival by sharing in ethical social and 
life behaviors with fellow humans. Fourth, drawing on Levinas and his ethics as first philosophy, 
Ernest states— 
 
we owe a debt to the other that precedes and goes beyond reasons, decisions, and our thought processes, 
and precedes and exceeds any attempt to understand the other. Our infinite responsibility to the other 
person is, of course, ethical: “Ethics precedes ontology […] ethics primarily signifies obligation toward 
the other, that it leads to the Law and to gratuitous service, which is not a principle of technique” 
(Levinas, 1987, p. 183). (p. 13) 
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In the end, Ernest contends that positioning ethics as the first philosophy for mathematics 
education research enables the larger research community “to rethink and re-evaluate some of the 
taken-for-granted commonplaces of our practices” (p. 14). Such re-thinking and -evaluating opens 
up different possibilities for theorizing and researching mathematics teaching and learning. 
How ethics is taken up across the paradigm spectrum is not so much about difference as it is about 
degree. Each of the paradigms—predict, understand, emancipate, and deconstruct—acknowledge 
at varying levels the importance of ethics throughout the research process. (Addressing and 
monitoring ethical concerns, however, have not always been practiced: e.g., the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study.) The difference is the degree to which the researcher’s focus is on procedural ethics, ethics 
in practice, or somewhere in between (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). Or, in the case of mathematics 
education research, points one and two (i.e., procedural ethics) or points three and four (i.e., ethics 
in practice) (Ernest, 2012).  
The positivists of the predict paradigm rely heavily on the check boxes of the Institutional Review 
Boards; that which is ethical is knowable, discernable, and demonstrable. Objective ethical 
procedures drive the research process; these procedures exist independent of both the researcher 
and the researched. In the understand paradigm, ethics is a both–and concern for the interpretivists 
and constructivists. In that, both procedural ethics and ethics in practice are taken up (Guillemin 
& Gillam, 2004). Reflexivity here becomes key as questions about researcher and participant 
positionality and how the process of conducting research affects both the study and the human 
relationships are continuously engaged (Glesne, 1999). Reflexivity is key for the critical theorists 
of the emancipate paradigm as well. But here reflexivity is intertwined with and in critical socio-
historical, -cultural, and -political interrogations of the so-named ethical procedures and practices 
(cf. Cannella & Lincoln, 2011). Conceptualizations of “good” research are expanded to include 
human well-being (Hostetler, 2005) and public interest (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 2006). Ethics in 
the deconstruct paradigm is interrogated further as even the possibility of ethics is considered. In 
other words, ethics, similar to existence, is always already contingent, multiple, fragmented, and 
becoming. Here, the governmentality (i.e., the way in which the state exercises control of its 
populace) of ethics becomes a grave concern as the ideal of a universal moral code of ethics is 
catastrophic (Foucault, 1978/2003a, 1984/1996). 
Summary of Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics 
Although dangerous, Table 2 provides a summary of the three philosophical considerations—
ontology, epistemology, and ethics—across the paradigms of inquiry spectrum—predict, 
understand, emancipate, and deconstruct. It is dangerous because reducing a few thousand words 
down to a few dozen always erases the nuances of that which has been discussed. Nonetheless, 
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similar to Table 1 (see Stinson & Bullock, 2015, for details and cautioning of Table 1), Table 2 is 
provided here to offer a summative account of the discussion.  
Table 2: Philosophical Considerations across the Spectrum of Paradigms of Inquiry 
Paradigm/ 
Consideration 
Predict Understand Emancipate Deconstruct 
Ontology –  
study of existence 
Objective Realism: 
existence 
independent of 
knower 
Subjective 
Relativism: existence 
dependent on 
uncritical 
interpretations and 
constructions of 
knower 
Historical Realism: 
existence through 
socio-historical,         
-cultural, and              
-political discourses 
of power 
Anti-Universal 
Realism: existence 
always already 
contingent, multiple, 
fragmented, and 
becoming 
Epistemology –  
study of knowledge 
Objectivism: 
knowledge 
independent  
Subjectivism: 
knowledge in and 
through interactions: 
interpreted and 
constructed 
Critical Subjectivism: 
knowledge in and 
through discourses 
of domination and 
oppression 
Discursive 
Formation: 
knowledge in and 
through discursive 
events  
Ethics –  
principles of morality 
Objective procedural 
ethics 
Procedural ethics 
and reflexive ethics 
in practice 
Critical integrations 
of procedural ethics 
and reflexive ethics 
in practice 
Ethics always already 
contingent, multiple, 
fragmented, and 
becoming; anti-
universal moral code 
of ethics  
CONCLUDING WORDS 
It is important to acknowledge that ontology, epistemology, and ethics are not the only 
philosophical considerations that are explicitly or implicitly engaged during the research process. 
Higginson (1980) also pointed to considerations about beauty (i.e., aesthetics), purpose (i.e., 
teleology), and value (i.e., axiology). In more general terms, how a researcher understands the 
possibilities or impossibilities of issues such as “truth,” “certainty,” and “logical consistency” is 
dependent on how she or he (or they) positions herself or himself (or themself) across the paradigm 
spectrum. Such decisions are not only about theoretical frameworks and methodological 
approaches but also, and more germane, about worldviews: a particular standpoint or philosophy 
for living in and making sense of the world. 
Lester and Wiliam (2005) claim that the relationship between knowledge claims and evidence 
regarding what is researched, how research is conducted, and how results are interpreted and 
represented is more than simply establishing logical consistency but rather is determined, in large 
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part, by a set of beliefs, values, and perspectives operating in the worldview of the researcher. 
Comparably, Lerman (2013) contends that the theoretical framework through which a researcher 
organizes her or his (or their) “research, reads the data, revisits theory and interprets the findings 
is critical, and without such work the values of the researcher are hidden but never absent, of 
course” (p. 629). Valero (2004) also points to researcher values: 
 
What we choose to research and the ways in which we carry out that research are constructions 
determined, among other factors, by who we are and how we choose to engage in academic inquiry… 
There are considerable ‘subjective’ and ‘ideological’ grounds—rather than ‘objective’ reasons—to 
engage in particular ways of conceiving and conducting research in mathematics education. (p. 2) 
 
Ultimately, considerations of ontology, epistemology, ethics, values, subjective and ideological 
grounds, and so on—that is, the researcher’s worldview—should precede not follow theoretical 
and methodological considerations. Explicitly and critically interrogating one’s worldview (i.e., 
one’s philosophical stances) should be the starting point of any research project, and maintained 
throughout. Without an explicit, critical, and continuous interrogation of one’s philosophical 
stances, researchers are often mired in simplistic conceptions and theoretical and methodological 
choices that perpetuate an “inquiry-as-technique mindset” (Paul & Marfo, 2001, p. 53) rather than 
inquiry-as-scholarly endeavor mindset (Boote & Beile, 2005). Throughout the process of 
conducting research on mathematics teaching and learning, such an interrogation might include 
asking a series of questions such as: Does mathematics, teaching, and/or learning exists outside of 
human interactions? How do we know that mathematics, teaching, and/or learning exists (or not)? 
What is mathematical knowing? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for mathematics 
knowing, mathematics teaching, and/or mathematics learning? Beyond procedural ethics, what are 
the ethical obligations of mathematics education researchers? Are the ethical obligations of 
mathematics education researchers different from other disciplinary researchers? Responses to 
these (and other) generic, if you will, questions that should be asked throughout the research 
process take on different possibilities depending on the philosophical stances of the researcher. 
Not only are the possibilities of responses unique but also the very questions that might be asked 
are unique. In other words, philosophically stances of the researcher drive both the possibilities 
and the impossibilities of what questions might be or should be asked throughout the research 
process. Maintaining a critical interrogation of one’s philosophical stances throughout is difficult 
because it refutes certainty and closure. But through an explicit, critical, and continuous 
exploration of one’s philosophical stances, the frantic search that novice (and even seasoned) 
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researchers often experience in selecting theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches, 
I believe, more times than not becomes self-evident and trivial.  
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